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DIVORCE AND ALIMONY DENIED FOR LACK
OF MARITAL DOMICILE
Loeb v. Loeb,
4 N.Y.2d 542, 152 N.E.2d 36 (1958)
Plaintiff and defendant were married in Connecticut in 1942. In
1944 the couple established their home in the state of Vermont, where
they maintained their marital domicile until 1951, when defendant hus-
band left plaintiff and subsequently obtained an ex parte divorce in
Nevada in July, 1952. The wife was not personally served and did not
appear in the action. The decree made no provision for her support.
In November, 1952, plaintiff challenged the validity of the Nevada
divorce in the Vermont County Court and petitioned that court for
support. Affirming a ruling that defendant's Nevada divorce decree
was entitled to full faith and credit, the Vermont Supreme Court in
May, 1955, reversed the lower court's award of support to plaintiff,
holding that it did not have jurisdiction, in the absence of statute, to
make such an award for support to a person who had been validly
divorced in another jurisdiction. 1
In August, 1953, plaintiff sold the Vermont home and has resided
in New York since October, 1953, when, she maintained, she formed the
intention of becoming a New York resident. While the Vermont action
was pending, plaintiff instituted an action under Section 1170-b of the
Civil Practice Act2 in the New York courts, seeking a divorce or sepa-
ration from defendant and provision for her support. She secured a
sequestration order against defendant who appeared generally in the
action. The trial court dismissed her complaint in all respects and the
court of appeals affirmed, holding the issues relating to the validity of the
Nevada divorce had been resolved against her in the Vermont proceeding
which she instituted, and that Mrs. Loeb, having first declared her in-
tention to become a New York resident over a year after her husband
secured the Nevada divorce, and having pursued her marital rights in
Vermont after announcing her intention to become a resident of New
York, could not be regarded as a "New York wife" entitled to relief
under Section 1170-b of the Civil Practice Act.3
Section 1170-b permits the New York courts to grant, "as justice
may require," maintenance to a wife in cases where it is not possible to
grant a divorce, separation or annulment because the marriage has already
1 Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472, 114 A.2d 518 (1955). The Vermont court relies
on Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1912), subsequently overruled in
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 419 (1956), insofar as it held that an
ex parte divorce destroyed alimony rights. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 162 Ohio
St. 406, 123 N.E.2d 267, af'd, 350 U.S. 568 (1955). See generally Annot., 28
A.L.R.2d 1378 (1953).
2 N.Y. Crw. PRAc. Acr § 1170-b (Nichols-Cahill Supp. 1958).
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been dissolved by the courts of another state, at the instance of the
husband, in an action in which personal service over the wife was not
obtained. The idea that a divorce decree may terminate the marital status
without affecting related property rights has been given expression by the
United States Supreme Court in the concept of "divisible divorce."
4
A 1957 decision of that court,5 upholding the constitutionality of Section
1170-b, applied this concept to establish that the full faith and credit
clause of the federal constitution and its implementing statute6 do not
require the state of a wife's domicile to recognize, as determinative of
her right to alimony, an otherwise valid ex parte divorce decree rendered
by another state, but that it is a personal right which exists separate and
apart from any divorce judgment, and of which the wife cannot there-
fore be deprived by any court acting without jurisdiction over her person. 7
Although by grounding its decision in the Vanderbilt case on the
invalidity of the foreign decree insofar as it purported to affect property
rights the Court makes it unnecessary any longer to weigh the competing
interests of two states when the question is whether a wife's support
rights have been affected by an ex parte divorce, it left open the question
of the interest the state court must have in the divorced wife before it
may adjudicate her rights to support. The New York court's ruling in
the instant case limits the state's interest in the protection of her support
rights to a wife who was domiciled in New York at the time the foreign
forum granted the divorce. The rationale implicit in this ruling was
earlier set forth by Mr. Justice Harlan as requiring such a result on
constitutional grounds:
Where a wife becomes a domiciliary of New York after
the ex parte divorce and is then granted support ... New York
could not pretend to be assuring the wife the . . . survival of
a pre-existing right, because the wife could have had no pre-
divorce rights in New York at all.. .. And . . . at the time
of the divorce New York would have had no interest in the
situation. . .. I should think New York would be forced to
look to the law of a state which had substantial contact with
these parties at the time of the divorce .... 8
The New York court avoids the constitutional questions thus posed
and chooses to dismiss Mrs. Loeb's claim by asserting her Vermont
domicile at the time of the divorce and her pursuit of her marital rights
in that state as factors disqualifying her as a "New York wife" (that
class of parties to which it presupposes the legislature intended to afford
protection under Section 1170-b). The language of the statute is not,
however, free from ambiguity, speaking simply in terms of "wives,"
4 Estin v. Estin, 334- U.S. 541 (1947).
1 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra note 1.
628 U.S.C. § 1738 (1950).
7 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1877).
8 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra note 1, at 433-34 (dissenting opinion).
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without specifying what group of wives or where such wives were to be
located when the husband obtained his divorce. It seems quite rightly
within the province of the New York court to construe the statute in
terms of an expressed legislative purpose "to protect a New York wife
whose right to support from her husband may be completely cut off by
an ex parte foreign divorce decree, in the absence of a previous New
York separation decree with provision for maintenance." 9  This seems
to assume a wife deserted in New York, however, and it becomes difficult
to justify the distinction made in the Vanderbilt case, the facts of which
show Mrs. Vanderbilt fortuitously to have timed her arrival in New York
state after her husband had left her in Connecticut but before the
Nevada decree was awarded him. 10
The refusal to grant Mrs. Loeb standing before the New York
court can be reconciled with the recognition of standing in Mrs. Vander-
bilt only if it is assumed that New York accepts the Vermont court's
definition of the term "wife" as designating an actual existing relation
and not the person enjoying or, in these cases, involuntarily relieved
from the status conferred by that relation. 1 The Vermont court denied
alimony on the basis of the view that with the dissolution of a marriage
relation there is no longer any "wife", and therefore the subject matter
which forms the basis for a separate maintenance action, only as an
incident of which alimony can be awarded under the Vermont statute,1
2
is extinguished.' 3 The New York court does not, however, announce this
reasoning as an expression of the conflicts rule it holds applicable, but
merely assumes that the only proper construction of the statute does not
permit its application to women who were not still married at the time
they came to live in New York.
Though sidestepped by the New York court, it seems obvious that
the constitutional arguments advanced by Mr. Justice Harlan as a barrier
to the result in Vanderbilt would prove an even greater obstacle to policy
considerations favoring an opposite result in Loeb. It might well be
argued that full faith and credit must be accorded the adjudication of
plaintiff's right to alimony, not by the Nevada court which awarded the
ex parte divorce, but by the Supreme Court of Vermont.' 4 Vermont was
certainly the state which had the most substantial contact with the mar-
riage, and no question is raised as to its jurisdiction over the parties. It
could, however, be questioned whether the Vermont judgment, holding
in essence that Mrs. Loeb had failed to state a cause of action under the
9 N.Y. LAW REV. COMM. REP RT 468 (1953).
10 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra note 1.
11 Contra, Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502, 2 Am. Rep. 415 (1869).
1 2
VT. STAT. § 3256 (1947).
13Loeb v. Loeb, supra note 1.
14 Cf. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933). A Georgia decree
fixing the amount of support to which a child was entitled as part of a general
divorce judgment was held to be entitled to full faith and credit so as to bar a
subsequent award of support to the child by a South Carolina court.
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laws of that state, was such as could be deemed a valid and binding final
determination on the merits of the interests of the parties. A foreign
judgment not on the merits is not conclusive to a subsequent action, 5
as, for example, a judgment for defendant on demurrer is no bar when
the declaration in a second suit properly alleges a cause of action.
1 6
The New York ruling, as proposed above, could as well have been
reached by the application of a conflicts rule precluding an adjudication
under its domesti rule regarding awards of alimony subsequent to ex
parte divorces, and requiring a decision against Mrs. Loeb's claim in
accord with the Vermont law on the subject. Had New York analyzed
the question in this manner and interpreted its conflicts rule as permitting
a determination under its own domestic law, however, of rights and
obligations arising out of the marriage contract which had been dissolved
before Mrs. Loeb became domiciled in New York, such determination
might be attacked as an erroneous application of the lex for7 instead of
looking to the foreign rule by which the matter should have been deter-
mined." Such errors by a state court in a choice of law problem have
been held to constitute a violation of due process of law within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment.""
It is far from settled, however, in approaching such questions as
choice of law problems, with which law the choice properly lies. The
courts do not question the propriety of decisions in the state of "matri-
monial domicile", 9 but these words have not been legally defined in a
way that attaches to them any import beyond their ordinary meaning,
the domicile of the parties living together as man and wife. Mr. Justice
Holmes early maintained that it is difficult to "see any ground for dis-
tinguishing between the extent of jurisdiction in the matrimonial domicile
and that ... in a domicile later acquired." 2  The rule of law supported
by reliance upon the term "matrimonial domicile" as it affected juris-
diction to grant binding divorce decrees has been overruled, 2' but the
concept seems still with us regarding the award of alimony. 22 A more
15 Warner v. Buffalo Dry Dock Co., 67 F.2d 540 (1933); RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 49 (1942).
16 Wilson & Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 300 Mo. 1, 254 S.W. 266 (1923);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 50 and comments (1942).
17 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S.
143 (1934), held that a valid choice of the lex fori will depend upon the relative
weight and number of forum contacts.
'
8lbid. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1929), held that a state
may not enlarge the obligations of the parties to a contract to accord with local
statutory policy solely on the ground that one of the parties is its own citizen;
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924).
19 See Goodrich, Matrimonial Domicile, 27 YALE L.J. 49 (1917).
20 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 631 (1906) (dissenting opinion).
21 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra note 1.
22Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 351, 135 N.E.2d 553, 557 (1955),
held Mrs. Vanderbilt had "a right to . . . bring the matrimonial domicile to
New York with her . . ." and that when she exercised this right after separation
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logical basis for deciding the choice of law issue would seem to be the
state's interest in its domiciliaries as it outweighs or fails to outweigh
conflicting interests, and thus allows or precludes the application of local
policy.
The question has been widely argued as to how much latitude on
grounds of local policy a state should have in according full faith and
credit to a sister state's judgments or when a state court's mistake in its
choice of law becomes serious enough that the Supreme Court will
reverse on the ground of due process.2" Expositing the many situations
in which the Supreme Court has recognized judgments valid in the state
where rendered but to which the full faith and credit clause gives no
force elsewhere, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo 24 have ex-
pressed the social policy warranting such exceptions. The policy may
apply as well when the constitutional due process provision is in issue. 25
In the assertion of rights, defined by a judgment of one
state, within the territory of another there is often an inescap-
able conflict of interest of the two states, and there comes a
point beyond which the imposition of the will of one state
beyond its own borders involves a forbidden infringement of
some legitimate domestic interest of the other. That point may
vary with the circumstances of the case, and in the absence of
provisions more specific than the general terms of the con-
gressional enactment this Court must determine for itself the
extent to which one state may qualify or deny rights claimed
under proceedings of other states.
2 16
The "legitimate domestic interest" of the second state justifying the
"divisible divorce" theory is the deep concern of the state where the
deserted wife is domiciled in the welfare of the family deserted by the
head of the household.
Returning to examine with a constitutionally unprejudiced eye the
language of Section 1170-b, one fails to find therein any indication
whether the legislature's purpose was (1) to lay down a procedural rule
with reference to New York maintenance actions or (2) substantively to
establish a policy protecting New York married women from impoverish-
ment after possible desertion by their husbands. The answer being by
no means clear from the statutory language, it is therefore open to a
court not bound by precedent to construe it as intended to accomplish the
but prior to the grant of the Nevada divorce she could avail herself of the
provisions of Section 1170-b.
23 GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAWS 31-32 n.80 (3rd ed. 1949) and articles cited
therein.
24Yarborough v. Yarborough, supra note 14 (dissenting opinion).
25 N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1913).
26 Yarborough v. Yarborough, supra note 14, at 214-15.
27 Supra note 4, at 547. "New York was rightly concerned lest the abandoned
spouse be left impoverished and perhaps become a public charge. The problem
of her livelihood and support is a matter in which her community had a legiti-
mate interest."
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second purpose only, and thus as a matter of construction to limit the
operation of the statute to women domiciled within the state during the
lives of their marriages. The way would thus be open for the court to
hold that its own conflicts rule refers the rights of "wives" domiciled
elsewhere, and so not covered by the statute, to the tests laid down in
their home states, as applied by the New York courts under whose juris-
diction such parties had come through domicile acquired subsequent to
their married lives.
A consideration of the public policy underlying the meaning and
purpose of Section 1170-b, affording the state's protection as warranted
by the interest of the state in having a quondam husband continue his
obligation to support his deserted wife, seems nevertheless just as validly
to permit a construction allowing the protection of alimony rights to a
divorced wife who comes to live in the state after a foreign divorce.
The reasoning Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo applied to the
facts of the Yarborough case28 seems applicable here. Applying their
views to the facts of the instant case, Vermont's interest in her support
ceased when the plaintiff became a domiciled resident of New York, and
9a new interest came into -being, the interest of the State [of the new
domicile] as a measure of self-preservation to secure the adequate pro-
tection and maintenance of... members of its own community .. 29
The facts of the instant case-that Mrs. Loeb's move to New York
was pursuant to an earlier agreement with her husband, her purchase of
a home, her duration of residence in excess of New York's one-year
jurisdictional residency requirement--should provide New York with at
least as great an interest in her continuing support as it would have in a
wife long domiciled and deserted in New York who intended to remain
only long enough to benefit from its statutory protection of her support
rights and then to move elsewhere to begin her life as a single woman.
This indeed was plaintiff's position under the jurisdiction of the Vermont
courts when she had abandoned her intent to maintain her domicile in
that state and moved to New York, intending to establish her home there.
Mrs. Loeb is not asking anything from the state of New York except
that its courts secure her support by her ex-husband in order to ensure
that she and her child not become charges of the state of New York-
a reason surely in conformity with the social policy and with the legis-
lative intent manifested by this statute, to prevent pauperized ex-wives
and children from becoming wards of the state.
The factual history of Mrs. Loeb's acquisition of New York
domicile should further dispel in her case the court's expressed concern
over an influx of "forum-shoppers". 0 Setting aside the question of the
unfairness of laws which leave husbands free to forum-shop for quick
28 Supra note 14.
29 Id. at 227.
304 N.Y.2d at 548, 152 N.E.2d at 39.
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and easy divorces, but deny their wives a similar shopping spree to seek
the re-establishment of support rights of which they have been deprived
at the same time they were unwillingly, indeed often unwittingly, shorn
of their marital status, there remains a serious policy inconsistency. For
when ex-wives become legally domiciled in New York with the intent
to make it their home, and legitimately so even though their motive be
only a preference for the climate of its laws over those of their home
states,3 it is by refusing to allow these women to assert under those laws
their rights to support that New York threatens itself with incurring the
very obligations of relief maintenance such support actions are devised
to prevent. Regardless of the attitude assumed on the question of
"forum-shopping", however, Judge Desmond's dissent32 negatives this
argument by pointing out that a contrary result in this or any one case
would in no way limit New York's discretion to determine on the facts
of each individual case "what justice may require."
Ruth S. Harutz
31 Matter of Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 238, 252, 84 N.E. 950, 955 (1908), held
that "[Mrs. Newcomb] could make the change because she preferred the laws
of Louisiana to those of New York . . . ."; see Note, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 87 (1920).
32Supra note 30, at 552, 152 N.E.2d at 41.
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